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A B S T R A C T  
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss empirical research examining the impact of corporate 
governance practice (CG) and accounting information quality (AIQ) on the cost of equity 
capital (COEC) in the context of agency problem and information asymmetry. This research 
uses a sample of 414 firms in the period between 2010 and 2013. The total observations consist 
of 1.656 firm-years. COEC, as a dependent variable is measured by price-earnings-growth 
(PEG) model. AIQ, as an independent variable is measured by absolute discretionary accrual 
as an inverse measure of accounting quality. CG is proxy by managerial ownership (MAN), 
measured by the percentage of management’s equity shares, and institutional ownership (INS) 
which is measured by the percentage of an institution's owned equity shares. The data used in 
this study is obtained from Indonesian Capital Market Directory, Indonesian Stock Exchange 
database, and from company annual reports. This research finds evidence of a negative 
association of AIQ and COEC. Since AIQ uses an inverse measure of accounting quality, this 
means that accounting quality increases COEC. Thus this result does not support the 
hypothesis. With respect to CG, both MAN and INS negatively affect COEC. This means that 
CG decreases COEC and support the hypothesis. 
 
 
A B S T R A K  
 
Paper ini mendiskusikan hasil riset empiris yang menginvestigasi pengaruh corporate 
governance (CG) dan kualitas informasi akuntansi (AIQ) terhadap cost of equity capital 
(COEC) dalam konteks masalah keagenan dan asimetri informasi. Riset ini menggunakan 
sampel sebanyak 414 perusahaan untuk periode antara tahun 2010 sampai 2013, sehingga 
jumlah observasi sebanyak 1.656 sampel. COEC, sebagai variable dependen diukur dengan 
model price-earnings-growth (PEG). AIQ, sebagai variable independen diukur dengan akrual 
diskresi absolut sebagai ukuran balikan kualitas informasi akuntansi. CG diproksi dengan 
kepemilikan manajerial (MAN) yang diukur dengan persentase saham yang dimiliki oleh 
manajemen, dan kepemilikan institusional (INS) yang diukur dengan persentase saham yang 
dimiliki oleh institusi. Data yang digunakan berasal dari Indonesian Capital Market Directory 
(ICMD), database Bursa Efek Indonesia, dan laporan tahunan perusahaan. Riset ini 
menemukan bahwa AIQ dan COEC berhubungan secara negative. Karena AIQ menggunkaan 
ukuran balikan kualitas informasi akuntansi, hasil ini mengandung arti bahwa kualitas 
informasi akuntansi meningkatkan COEC sehingga hasil ini tidak mendukung hipotesis. 
Variable CG yang terdiri atas MAN dan INS berpengaruh negative terhadap COEC. Hal ini 
berarti CG menurunkan COEC sehingga mendukung hipotesis penelitian. 
 
 
Introduction  
This paper discusses empirical research examining the impact of corporate governance practice and accounting 
quality on the cost of equity capital in the context of agency problem and information asymmetry. Corporate 
governance has been the most crucial issue in emerging financial markets since the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
(Byun, Kwak, & Hang, 2008). Several accounting scandals in developed markets have also increased public interest 
in the issue of corporate governance. The lower transparency or firm opacity to outside investors has been a subject 
of serious concern. This has raised the awareness of the importance of sound corporate governance systems as a 
way to protect outside shareholder rights.  
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Bushman and Smith (2003) stated that some researchers (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; DeFond & 
Subramanyam, 1998; Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 1994) had already addressed the role of financial accounting 
information with reference to the operation of various corporate governance practices, such as board of directors, 
shareholder litigation, debt covenants, and audit function. Financial accounting information is an important source 
of firm-specific information which shareholders use when monitoring managers and concentrated owners. 
Therefore, high quality of financial reporting practice can alleviate agency problems, enhances the economic 
performance of firms, which in turn reduce external financing costs. 
The role of corporate governance in creating value for shareholders has become the subject of intense 
interest in corporate finance research. The importance of mechanisms that align the interests of managers and 
shareholders and insider expropriation has been widely acknowledged (Pham, Suchard, & Zein, 2012). However, 
despite this general acceptance of the role of corporate governance, empirical research has remained inconclusive, 
especially those regard to the extent to which individual monitoring mechanisms enhance firm performance and 
shareholder value (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
Previous studies focus on the fact that a strong governance environment can limit divergence of cash flows 
and thus increase a firm's valuation. This can reduce a firm's cost of capital and thus implicitly increase firm value. 
Pham et al. (2012) argue that a strong corporate governance environment is able to decrease firm's cost of capital 
and hence implicitly increase firm value. A firm’s cost of capital reflects investors’ required return based on the 
firm’s systematic risk (Pham et al., 2012). Previous studies find that firm’s with weak governance perform 
particularly poorly during market downturns and thus should be subject to a higher cost of capital. If external 
monitoring of insiders is inadequate, managers may undertake excessive borrowings to finance unproductive 
projects which increase a firm’s exposure to market-wide risk and ultimately increase the cost of capital. In addition, 
the cost of capital for poorly governed firms can also increase because a lack of corporate transparency leads to 
higher issuing and transaction costs (Pham et al., 2012). 
The improved corporate disclosure practice can help decrease the transaction costs and liquidity risk 
between the firm and investors or among investors (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz 
& Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001). Therefore, good quality of financial reports can reduce the cost of equity 
capital and enhance the firm performance. Theoretical research has made an important progress in explaining how 
a firm-specific information risk is priced and cannot be diversified (Easley & O’hara, 2004; Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2005; O’Hara, 2003). Based on the theoretical research, several accounting studies have been conducted to 
investigate whether financial reporting quality, when weakened by poor corporate governance practices, increases 
firms’ exposure to information risk and, thus increases the cost of equity capital (Aboody, Hughes, & Liu, 2005; 
Chen, Shevlin, & Tong, 2007; Francis et al., 2004, 2005). These sdies the design of contracts to motivate a rational 
agent to act on behalf of a principal when the agent’s interests would otherwise conflict with those of the principal 
(Scott, 2015). Monitoring practice, to ensure that actions performed by the agent are in line with the principle's 
interests, is hard to be realized because of the complexity of agent's activities. This situation is called information 
asymmetry (Scott, 2015). Information asymmetry is a condition where some parties to business transactions may 
have a relevant information advantage over others. Agency problem arises when there is information asymmetry 
both in term of activities and information owns by an agent. The first problem is called hidden action and the 
second problem is called hidden information. Hidden action leads to moral hazard whereas hidden information 
leads to adverse selection (Arifin, 2009). Moral hazard is a type of information asymmetry whereby one or more 
parties to the business transaction, or potential transaction, can observe their action in fulfillment of the transaction 
but not the other parties. Adverse selection is a type of information asymmetry whereby one or more parties to the 
business transaction, or potential transaction, have an information advantage over other parties (Scott, 2015). 
Information asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem when managers have incentives to follow their 
own interests at shareholder expense. Self-interested managerial behavior can take several forms including shirking, 
consumption of perquisites, overcompensation, and empire building, all of which increase agency risk. Information 
asymmetry also creates an adverse selection problem when investors cannot detect the true economic value of the 
firm that is partially a function of the indistinguishable quality of management. Imperfect information on 
management quality and a firm‘s economic value results in greater agency risk being imposed on the shareholder. 
Corporate governance encompasses a broad spectrum of mechanisms intended to mitigate moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems, that is, agency risk, by increasing the monitoring of managements‘ actions and limiting 
managers‘ opportunistic behavior (Skaife et al., 2004). Prior research conceives that quality financial information 
reduces firm risk and, consequently, the cost of equity by increasing market liquidity, thereby reducing transactions 
costs or increasing the demand for a firm‘s securities (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). 
Previous research indicates that a decrease in information asymmetry should reduce the cost of equity 
capital through reduced transaction costs and estimation risk. Study on the relation between accounting information 
and information risk are surveyed by (Callahan, Yohn, & Lee, 1997). They summarize research on the relation 
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between earnings announcements and information asymmetry. The initial theoretical model of information 
asymmetry primarily focuses on public disclosure reducing information asymmetry in the stock market. The next 
model shows that information asymmetry may be closely related to trading prior to earnings announcements. 
Following these models, three broad categories of empirical research have been introduced: accounting disclosure, 
accounting information quality, and managers’ behavior. Overall, empirical research related to information 
asymmetry concludes that improving the information environment through corporate disclosure can reduce 
transaction costs and hence, the cost of capital. 
Easley and O’hara (2004) emphasize the important role of accounting information accuracy in asset 
pricing. They develop a model that shows how differences in public and private information affect the cost of equity 
capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) develop a model to analyze the link between information quality and the cash 
flows of firms. This model captures the fundamental relation between the improvement of the efficiency of firms’ 
investment decisions and an increase in expected cash flow. 
Recent empirical studies on financial reporting quality use the direct estimation of the cost of equity capital 
instead of the bid-ask spread, which is the limited information of the cost of equity capital (Skaife et al., 2004). 
Francis et al. (2004 and 2005) examine the relation between earnings quality or accrual quality and the cost of 
capital. They find a negative relation between the accounting-based and market-based earnings attributes and the 
cost of capital. In addition, by decomposing the accrual quality into inherent factors and discretionary factors, they 
also find that the cost of equity capital depends on the accrual quality. Moreover, Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005) 
examine the argument that earning quality affects the cost of capital in two stages. They find that the pricing of the 
earnings quality and the degree of the pricing are pronounced in firms with higher exposure to the earnings quality 
factor. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) examine the effect of accounting restatement on the cost of equity capital. They 
find that because accounting restatements can cause revisions in overall earnings quality, accounting restatements 
also result in lower expected future earnings and a higher cost of equity capital for firms. 
Several studies directly address the issue that corporate governance risk which arises from a weak 
governance system can affect firms’ cost of equity capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006; Chen et al., 
2003; Cheng et al., 2006). Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) investigate the impact of governance 
attributes, such as financial information quality, ownership structure, shareholder rights, and board structure, on 
firms’ cost of equity capital. Their results show that both financial information quality and board structure are 
negatively related to the implied cost of equity capital estimates, whereas concentrated ownership in the form of a 
number of block holders is positively related to the implied cost of equity capital. 
 
Literarute Review 
Financial Reporting Quality and the Cost of Equity Capital 
Financial statements which do not provide sufficient financial information and disclosures are assumed to be the 
risky and unqualified financial statements. Consequently, investors require a high return and therefore firms should 
expense the high cost of capital. (Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007) demonstrate that the quality of accounting 
information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher 
quality disclosures affect the firm's assessed covariance with other firms' cash flows, which is non-diversifiable. The 
indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the 
firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash 
flows in the market. Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) show that this effect can go in either direction, but it 
also derives conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost 
of capital. Overall, they find that the increase of accounting information quality decreases the cost of capital. 
Botosan (1997) examines the association between the cost of equity capital and levels of the annual report 
and timely disclosure, and investor relations activities. She finds that the greater disclosure is associated with a 
lower of the cost of equity. Yet, for firms with a high analyst following, she finds no evidence of an association 
between their measure of disclosure level and cost of equity capital perhaps because the disclosure measure is 
limited to the annual report and may not provide a powerful proxy for overall disclosure level when analyst play a 
significant role in the communication process. Moreover, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find that the cost of equity 
capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the level of timely disclosures. The latter 
result is contrary to theory but is consistent with managers’ claims that greater timely disclosures may increase the 
cost of equity capital, possibly through increased stock price volatility.  
Chen et al. (2003) examine the effects of disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms on the 
cost of equity capital in Asia's emerging markets with newly released surveys from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA). They find that both disclosure and non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms have a significantly 
negative effect on the cost of equity capital. In addition, the effect of non-disclosure governance mechanisms is 
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more profound than that of disclosure on the cost of equity capital. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) 
examine governance attributes along four dimensions: (1) financial information quality, (2) ownership structure, 
(3) shareholder rights, and (4) board structure. They find that firms reporting larger abnormal accruals and less 
transparent earnings have a higher cost of equity, whereas firms with more independent audit committees have a 
lower cost of equity. Li et al. (2009) find that lower quality of earnings is associated with an increased cost of equity 
capital. Armstrong et al. (2009) find that relationship between information quality and cost of capital is negative. 
Francis et al. (2005) investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. They 
find that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures than firms with poor earnings 
quality. They also find that more voluntary disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital.  
Kopecká (2016) finds that segment disclosure quality has a negative linear effect on a firm’s cost of capital. 
Gao (2010) find that cost of capital could increase with disclosure quality when new investment is sufficiently 
elastic. Xu and Tang (2015) find that firms domiciled in the more conservative financial reporting systems countries 
have a significantly lower cost of debt and cost of equity capital. Hong, Ma, and Zhang (2018) find that earnings 
quality is negatively related to the A-B share price differential and that the negative effect is more pronounced for 
firms with large information disparities between the markets. Finally, Apergis et al. (2011) find an increase in 
expected cash flows, coming from improvements in the quality of accounting information, leads to a reduction in 
the firm’s cost of capital. On the basis of the above description, the hypothesis can be stated in an alternative form 
as follows: 
H1: Accounting quality negatively affects the cost of equity capital. 
 
Managerial Ownership and Cost of Equity Capital  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that managerial ownership is one of the solutions to reduce agency problems 
by synchronizing manager’s interest and shareholders’ interest. Core, Hail, and Verdi (2015) find that managerial 
ownership decreases the cost of capital. Huang, Wang, and Zhang (2009) find that managerial ownership aligns 
managers' interests with those of shareholders, leading to a lesser degree of agency problems and lower cost of 
equity capital. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that managerial ownership could substitute for shareholder rights 
in affecting the cost of equity capital, making strong shareholder rights less important in a high managerial 
ownership setting. Shah and Butt (2009) find a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the cost 
of equity. The convergence-of-interest hypothesis posits managerial ownership promotes goals congruence and 
lowers agency cost because insiders are not only managers but also owners of the firm. Owner-managers avoid 
value destruction activities in order to protect their mainly undiversified shareholdings. Pham, Suchard, and Zein 
(2012) find that the insiders' tendency to protect firms’ investment reduced the perceived risk of a firm, thereby 
prompting investors to accept a reduction in the risk premium leading to a lower cost of capital. On the basis of the 
above description, the hypothesis can be stated in an alternative form as follows: 
H2: Managerial ownership negatively affects the cost of equity capital. 
 
Institutional Ownership and Cost of Equity Capital  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that institutional arrangements would yield net benefits from the reduction of 
the agency costs. Tehranian et al. (2006) demonstrate that Institutional ownership of shares reduces the use of 
discretionary accruals in earnings management. Furthermore, the monitoring action by institutional investors may 
motivate managers to more focus on firm’s performance. This, in turn, decreases opportunistic behavior of 
managers. Easley and O’hara (2004) show that differences in the composition of information between public and 
private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater 
private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to 
incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and 
quality of information affect asset prices. Therefore, theoretically the higher the private information, the higher cost 
of capital. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) find that firms with a greater proportion of their shares 
held by activist institutions receive a lower cost of equity. Attig, Guedhami, and Mishra (2008) find evidence that 
the implied cost of equity decreases with the presence, number, and voting size of large shareholders beyond the 
controlling owner. They also find that the identity of the second largest shareholder is important in determining the 
risk of corporate expropriation in family-controlled firms. Their findings imply that majority shareholders play an 
important role in overcoming information asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders, which in turn 
decreases cost of equity capital. In the case of investing in financially constrained firms, the increase in ownership 
by some institutional investors can be attributed to the investors’ expectation about the investee’s long-term growth 
potential. In other words, for long-term institutional investors to increase the stake of ownership in a financially 
constrained firm is similar to certifying the investee to meet their higher standards for which they are known. 
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Stinson and Ricketts (2016) find that significant increases in institutional ownership for high-risk firms led to larger 
reductions in the implied cost of equity capital. On the basis of the above description, the hypothesis can be stated 
in an alternative form as follows: 
H3: Institutional ownership negatively affects cost of equity capital. 
 
Research Method  
This study examines the relationship between accounting information quality, corporate governance, and cost of 
equity capital. The samples used in this research are firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in the 
year of 2010 to 2013. The sample was selected using the purposive sampling technique. The first requirement is 
that it is a public company listed at the IDX from 2010 to 2013. The second requirement is that those firms should 
have complete data needed for the research. The third criterion is that these firms report EPS for the year of t+1 as 
well as EPS for the year of t. The last criterion is that the firms have publicly available information. The data came 
from three sources, (1) Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD), Indonesian Stock Exchange website: 
www.idx.co.id, and (3) company's website. The unit analysis used in this research is firm-year. 
 The dependent variable cost of capital (COEC) is the required return rate by investors for their investments 
in equity capital where COEC is calculated by PEG model as proposed by Easton (2004).  
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐶௉ாீ = ට
ா௉ௌమିா௉ భ
௉బ
 (1) 
Where:  
EPS2  = Expected accounting earnings per share for period t = 2.  
EPS1  = Expected accounting earnings per share for period t = 1.  
P0  = Current year share price.  
 
The PEG-ratio is a special case of model of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Two important 
assumptions underlying the Easton formula are: (1) There is no change in abnormal earnings beyond the forecast 
horizon, and (2) There are no dividend payments prior to the earnings forecasts. Forecasts of earnings and forecasts 
of short-run earnings growth are readily available as a practical matter. Several institutions provide forecasts of 
earnings for the current year, for the next year, and for the short-run future. For COEC calculation, forecasts of 
earnings two years ahead as a proxy for EPS2 and forecast of earnings one year ahead as a proxy for EPS1. This 
research uses three independent variables, which consist of accounting information quality (AIQ), managerial 
ownership (MAN), and institutional ownership (INS).  
 Accounting information quality is a result of firm’s financial reporting system which routinely measures 
and disclosures quantitative information about audited and published financial position and firm’s performance 
(Bushman & Smith, 2003). Accounting quality is proxied by accounting earnings (Krismiaji, Aryani, & Suhardjanto, 
2016). This variable is measured by discretionary accrual and estimated by Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 
1996) in the following equation:  
𝑇𝐴𝐶௜,௝,௧ = 𝛽ଵ௝௧ ൤
ଵ
்஺೔,ೕ,೟షభ
൨ + 𝛽ଶ௝௧
൫∆ோ௘௩೔,ೕ,೟ି∆஺ோ೔,ೕ,೟൯
்஺೔,ೕ,೟షభ
+ 𝛽ଷ௝௧
௉௉ா೔,ೕ,೟
்஺೔,ೕ,೟షభ
+ 𝜀௜௝௧ (2) 
where TACijt is the total accruals for firm i, industry j for year t scaled by total assets for year t−1; TAijt−1 is the total 
assets for year t−1; ΔREVijt are revenues for firm i, for year t less revenues for firm i for year t−1 industry j scaled 
by total assets for year t−1; ΔRECijt are receivables for firm i for year t less receivables for firm i for year t−1, 
industry j scaled by total assets for year t−1; and PPEijt gross property plant and equipment for firm i for year t 
industry j scaled by total assets for year t−1. εijt is the error term. Discretionary accruals (DA) for year t are estimated 
as the absolute values of residuals from the cross-sectional ordinary least-square (OLS) estimates of Equation (2). 
The value of absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) is a proxy for accounting information quality. ABSDA is an 
inverse measure of accounting information quality, therefore the lower ABSDA, the higher the quality of accounting 
information. 
 Managerial ownership is a cumulative percentage of management’s equity shares. The indicator used to 
measure managerial ownership is a number of shares owned divided by all outstanding's share. Referring to Ang 
and Ding (2006), we define institutional ownership is a cumulative percentage of financial institutional and other 
business institution's equity shares. The indicator used to measure institutional ownership is a number of shares 
owned divided by all outstanding's share. 
 Three control variables are used in this research. They are Size, the proxy of firm’s size; Lev, the ratio of 
total liabilities and total assets, and ROE, the ratio of net profit and total equities. Size is a control variable which is 
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used to control the variations of firm’s size. Firm size is a well-established determinant of firm's value and has an 
effect on many aspects of a firm's operation. This variable is measured by log total assets. This measure reflects 
firm’s size. Hail and Leuz (2006); Christensen, de la Rosa, and Feltham (2010); Daske (2006); Kim and Shi (2012); 
Li (2010) suggest that firm’s size decrease cost of capital since investors in large firms require low return which in 
turn decrease cost of capital. LEV or leverage is a control variable which is used to control the variations of firm’s 
capital structure. This variable is measured by dividing total liabilities by total assets. The low leverage indicates 
that a company has a small number of liabilities and low cost of debt (Kim & Shi, 2012; Li, 2010) and the higher 
the leverage, the higher return required by investors. ROE (return on equity) is a control variable which is used to 
control firm’s profit variability. This variable is measured by dividing net income by firm's total equity. The higher 
ROE, the lower the cost of capital Castillo-Merino, Menéndez-Plans, and Orgaz-Guerrero (2014). 
 
Model Specification 
The main statistical method to test the hypotheses is the GLS regression. The GLS regression model is estimated as 
follows:  
COECit = α + β1AIQit + β2MANit + β3INSit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6ROEit + εit (3) 
Where: 
COECit  =  Cost of equity capital of firm i in the year t, 
AIQit  =  Accounting information quality which is proxied by absolute discretionary accrual (ABSDA) of firm i 
in the year t, 
MANit  =  Managerial ownership of firm i in the year t, 
IN it  =  Institutional ownership of firm i in the year t 
SIZEit  =  Log total asset is the proxy of firm size of firm i in the year t, 
LEVit =  Leverage ratio of firm i in the year t, 
ROEit =  Profitability of firm i in the year t, and  
εit = error term. 
  
Results and Discussion 
On the basis of the sampling process described, this study used 414 firms in the period between 2010 and 2013 as 
the data sample. The total observations consist of 1.656 firm-years. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
sample data. From Table 1, it can be seen that the mean of the COEC shows a value of 0.28 with a standard 
deviation of 0.52. This means that in average, the sample firms have to pay their funding cost in the rate of 25%. 
AIQ which is a measure of accounting information quality has a mean of 0.92 with a standard deviation of 8.54. 
Institutional ownership has a mean of 0.64 with a standard deviation of 0.26 whereas managerial ownership has a 
mean of 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.07. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
COEC 0.28 0.18 11.47 0.00 0.52 
AIQ 0.92 0.12 217.99 0.00 8.54 
INS 0.64 0.69 1.13 0.00 0.26 
MAN 0.02 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.07 
LEV 0.55 0.50 11.84 0.00 0.53 
ROE 36.62 9.56 43013.58 -612.40 1060.60 
SIZE 6.26 6.25 8.87 3.49 0.85 
 
To test the hypotheses, this study uses multiple regression models. The procedure uses generalized least 
square (GLS) estimation method. The classic assumptions of regression model were tested before the regression 
statistics analysis was conducted. The assessment shows that the residuals were normally distributed and there were 
no problems with multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation in the data. The correlation among 
variables is presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation 
 COEC AIQ INS MAN LEV ROE 
AIQ -.018      
INS .029 -.023     
MAN -.018 -.022 -.224**    
LEV .040 -.022 -.034 -.005   
ROE -.012 -.003 .001 -.008 -.005  
Size -.097** .104** -.193** -.099** -.050* .015 
 **, * show that correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and 0.05 level  
respectively (2-tailed). 
 
The table shows that the correlation between independent variables less than 0.70. This indicates that there 
is no multicollinearity among independent variables. The correlation coefficient between AIQ and COEC is 
negative. It is an initial indication that AIQ negatively affects COEC. The correlation coefficient between 
institutional and COEC is positive, whereas the correlation between managerial ownership variables and COEC is 
negative. This will be further investigated in regression analysis.  
 The regression analysis results to test the hypotheses are presented in Table 3. Using the equation model 
(3), we split our analysis into two sub-models as follows: 
COEC it = α + β1AIQit + β2MAN + β3INS + β4SIZE + β5LEV + β6ROE it + εit  (3a) 
COEC it = α + β1AIQit + β2MAN*AIQ + β3INS*AIQ + β4SIZE + β5LEV + β6ROEit + εit   (3b) 
 
Table 3. Regression Analysis  
 Model 3a  Model 3b 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic 
Intercept  0.647  145.800  0.653***  113.242 
AIQ -0.001***  21.569  -0.001***  -2.730 
INS  -0.022***  -5.861  -0.025***  -7.279 
AIQ*INS    0.003**  1.991 
MAN  -0.034**  -1.780  -0.047***  -3.087 
AIQ*MAN    -0.177***  -27.557 
LEV  0.036***  10.723  0.038***  27.330 
ROE -0.003***  -8.627  -0.003***  -8.413 
SIZE  -0.063***  168.543  -0.064***  -67.884 
      
Adj. R2 0.407   0.328   
F-statistic 190.812***   101.873***  
***, **, * show that coeficient is significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively  
 
The main objective of splitting the model into two models is to ensure the consistency of the analysis 
results. To test whether there is an association between COEC and AIQ (H1), the variable investigated is AIQ. The 
Column Model 3a in Table 3 shows the regression result. The result shows a negative (-0.001) and significant 
coefficient in the level α=0.01. This result indicates that the accounting information quality associated negatively 
with COEC. Therefore, when AIQ decrease, COEC increase. Since AIQ is an inverse measure of accounting quality, 
it means that the decrease in AIQ equal to the increase in accounting quality. It can be concluded that H1 which 
states that accounting quality negatively affects the cost of equity capital is not supported by empirical data.  
Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can 
influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures 
affect the firm's assessed covariance with other firms' cash flows, which is non-diversifiable. The indirect effect 
occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the 
expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. 
Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) show that this effect can go in either direction, but it also derives conditions 
under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital. Overall, they 
find that the increase of accounting information quality decreases the cost of capital.  
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This result is not consistent to previous research done by Botosan (1997) who finds that the greater 
disclosure is associated with a lower of cost of equity, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) who find that the cost of equity 
capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the level of timely disclosures, Chen, Chen, 
and Wei (2003) who find that both disclosure and non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms have a 
significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) who find 
that firms reporting larger abnormal accruals and less transparent earnings have a higher cost of equity, whereas 
firms with more independent audit committees have a lower cost of equity, and Apergis et al. (2011) who find an 
increase in expected cash flows, coming from improvements in the quality of accounting information, leads to a 
reduction in the firm’s cost of capital. We suspect that the information quality measure used in this research may 
become one of the causes the different result, compared to the previous study.  
The Column Model 3a in Table 3 also shows a negative (-0.034) and significant coefficient in the level 
α=0.01 for MAN. This indicates that the managerial ownership negatively affects the cost of equity capital. 
Therefore, hypothesis 2 which stated that managerial ownership negatively affects the cost of equity capital is 
supported by the empirical data. Moreover, when this result is confirmed with the result in column 3b in Table 3 in 
which the correlation coefficient of interaction variable of AIQ*MAN is negative (-0.177) and significant. This 
result is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) who stated that managerial ownership is one of the solutions 
to reduce agency problems by synchronizing manager's interest and shareholders' interest. Moreover, this result is 
also consistent with the previous studies performed by Shah and Butt (2009); Core, Hail, and Verdi (2015) who 
find that managerial ownership decreases cost of capital, Huang, Wang, and Zhang (2009) who find that managerial 
ownership aligns managers' interests with those of shareholders, leading to a lesser degree of agency problems and 
lower cost of equity capital.  
The Column Model 3a in Table 3 also shows a negative (-0.022) and significant coefficient in the level 
α=0.01 for INS. This indicates that the institutional ownership negatively affects the cost of equity capital. 
Therefore, hypothesis 3 which stated that institutional ownership negatively affects the cost of equity capital is 
supported by the empirical data. But, when this result is confirmed with the result in column 3b in Table 3 in which 
the correlation coefficient of interaction variable of AIQ is positive (0.003) and significant. This probably indicates 
that institution owners are not strong enough to overcome the agency problems especially when it interacts with 
accounting quality which is measured by AIQ.  
Yet, individually this result is consistent to Jensen and Meckling (1976) who stated that institutional 
arrangements would yield net benefits from the reduction of the agency costs. Furthermore, this result is also 
consistent with Tehranian et al. (2006) who find that institutional ownership of shares reduces the use of 
discretionary accruals in earnings management, Easley and O’hara (2004) who show that differences in the 
composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, and thus the higher 
the private information, the higher cost of capital, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) who find that firms 
with a greater proportion of their shares held by activist institutions receive a lower cost of equity, and Attig, 
Guedhami, and Mishra (2008) who find evidence that the implied cost of equity decreases with the presence, 
number, and voting size of large shareholders beyond the controlling owner.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether corporate governance, accounting information quality affect the cost of equity 
capital. The result indicates that accounting information does not decrease the cost of equity capital, and therefore 
it does not support H1 which state that accounting quality negatively associated with the cost of equity capital. The 
results also indicate that managerial ownership and institutional ownership do decrease the cost of equity capital. 
The results support H2 and H3 which state that managerial ownership and institutional negatively associated with 
the cost of equity capital. 
The result has an implication, in which this confirm agency theory which predicts that monitoring and 
controlling activities by owners enhance the firm’s efficiency. This research proves that managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership decrease firm’s cost of equity capital which means that firm’s efficiency enhance. 
This research has several limitations. First, we use one accounting quality measures, which differ from that 
of previous research. This may lead to the inconsistency compare to that of previous research. Therefore, future 
research may be performed by using more than one quality measures. Second, we use data in the period of 2010 – 
2013. This is the period where Indonesian companies are in the transition to adopt the new and high-quality 
accounting standard. Therefore, there is an opportunity for future research by involving data in the period after 
2012, the starting period of full adoption of the new accounting standards. 
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